Mineral Rights - Cancellation of Lease - Obligation to Develop by Hines, Billy H.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 4
June 1955
Mineral Rights - Cancellation of Lease - Obligation
to Develop
Billy H. Hines
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Billy H. Hines, Mineral Rights - Cancellation of Lease - Obligation to Develop, 15 La. L. Rev. (1955)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol15/iss4/26
NOTES
MINERAL RIGHTS-CANCELLATION OF LEASE-OBLIGATION
TO DEVELOP
Plaintiff lessor and defendant Shell Oil Company on July
30, 1935, executed an oil and gas lease covering an eighty-four
acre tract for a primary term of ten years. Subsequently, the
other defendant Vanson Production Corporation acquired the
entire lease from Shell Oil Company. On July 23, 1945, forty-
four acres of the leased tract were included in a drilling unit
formed by the Department of Conservation. No well was ever
drilled on the leased premises, but a producing gas well was
brought in on the portion of the unit outside the leased prem-
ises after the expiration of the primary term of the lease.
Alleging that defendants had failed to develop the portion of
the leased tract lying outside the unit and that plaintiff had
received from another party a bona fide offer to develop it,
plaintiff sought cancellation of that portion of the lease. De-
fendant Shell Oil Company obtained a judgment of nonsuit.
From a judgment on the merits in favor of defendant Vanson
Production Company, plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed. In
refusing to drill a well on plaintiff's land outside the unit where
the plaintiff had received another party's bona fide offer to do
so, defendant failed to fulfill its obligation to develop. Plaintiff
was entitled to cancellation of the lease on the portion of the
leased premises lying outside the unit. Nunley v. Shell Oil Co.,
76 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1954).
In Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co.1 and LeBlanc v. Danciger
Oil & Refining Co., 2 the court denied the lessor a cancellation
of the lease on the portion of the leased premises lying outside
the unit. However, in those cases a well had been drilled on
the unit during the primary term of the lease. Moreover, in
each case the plaintiff was relying on the failure of defendant
during the primary term of the lease to drill a well on the
portion of the leased premises lying outside the unit, and not,
as in the instant case, on defendant's failure to develop that
portion. In the Hunter and LeBlanc cases the court held that
the lessee's obligation to drill a well had been fulfilled by the
drilling of a well on the unit, although not on the leased prem-
1. 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1946-1947 Term--Mineral Rights, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 212,
216 (1948); Comment, 12 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 445, 452 (1952).
2. 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Mineral Rights, 12 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW
131, 132 (1952); Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 445, 452 (1952).
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ises, during the primary term of the lease. Therefore, in both
cases, since a well had been drilled and since the lessor failed
to show nondevelopment of his leased premises, the court re-
fused to cancel the lease on any portion of the premises. How-
ever, the court's language in the Hunter case is significant:
"[I]f the producing well in the unit is not sufficient to meet
the obligation of adequate development of the property covered
by the lease, the law gives plaintiff a remedy."'3 Thus the
court recognized that the lessee was under an obligation to
develop the leased premises sufficiently. The court in Carter v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. also recognized the lessee's obliga-
tion to develop by saying that "the main consideration of a
mineral lease is the development of the leased premises for
minerals."'4 In Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co.5 the same point
was also emphasized.
In the instant case no well had been drilled on the unit
during the primary term of the lease. Moreover, the lessor was
able to prove that defendant lessee had failed to reasonably
develop the leased premises. The lessor showed that a prudent
operator had made a bona fide offer to lease the forty-acre por-
tion of the premises lying outside the unit and had offered both
immediate payment and his promise to drill a well. The lessee,
on the other hand, introduced the opinion of a geologist that
all of that portion of plaintiff's premises, with the possible
exception of one acre, would be completely unproductive. The
court, however, pointed out that the opinions of geologists are
frequently erroneous and refused to accept his opinion. The
defendant further maintained that he should be allowed to
retain the lease because of certain privileges such as laying
pipelines and because the property might become valuable sub-
sequently as a result of possible production from another for-
mation. In rejecting this contention, the court stated that all
rights of a lessee are determined on the basis of his compliance
with his obligation to develop prudently and reasonably the
leased premises.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is sound.
As indicated above, it can be distinguished from the Hunter
3. 211 La. 893, 905, 31 So.2d 10, 14 (1947).
4. 213 La. 1028, 1034, 36 So.2d 26, 28 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-Mineral Rights, 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 189, 191 (1949).
5. 225 La. 790, 74 So.2d 30 (1954); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1958-1954 Term-Mineral Rights, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
300, 309 (1955); 3 OL & GAs REP. 1876 (1954).
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and LeBlanc cases. The decision is also consistent with a deci-
sion rendered in Mississippi. In Texas Gulf Producing Co. v.
Griffith, the Mississippi Supreme Court, confronted with a simi-
lar fact situation, allowed cancellation of the lease on the por-
tion of the tract lying outside the unit and said that to hold
otherwise would "be a violation of the constitutional guaranty
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law." A most significant point in the instant case
is that plaintiff lessor was able to overcome a geologist's testi-
mony by showing that he had received from a prudent operator
a bona fide offer to drill if the land was freed from the lease.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Romero v. Humble
Oil and Refining Co.7 had taken a step in that direction, but
had required the plaintiff's offeror to give assurance that he
would drill before the lease to defendant would be cancelled
for nondevelopment. Because of the importance the court in
the instant case seemed to place on the fact that a well had
been drilled during the primary term in both the Hunter and
the LeBlanc cases, it is not entirely clear whether the result
reached in the instant case would have been the same had the
lessee drilled during the primary term. However, the remedy
afforded the lessor in the instant case was probably within the
contemplation of the court in the Hunter case.8 It is submitted
that regardless of when the well is drilled on the unit, if the
lessor can prove that the lessee has not adequately developed
the portion of the leased premises outside the unit, then the
lease on that portion should be cancelled.
Billy H. Hines
MINERAL RIGHTS-INTERPRETATION OF LEASE-EFFECT OF SIGNING
A DIVISION ORDER
Plaintiff lessors sued to cancel a mineral lease for failure of
lessee to drill or pay delay rentals as required by the terms of
the contract.' The lessee had completed and placed in production
6. 65 So.2d 447, 452 (Miss. 1953), 2 OIL & GAs REP. 1103, 1111 (1953).
7. 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), 1 OIL & GAS REP. 358 (1952).
8. See language quoted page 854 supra.
1. Section 4 of the lease provides in part: "If operations for the drilling
of a well be not commenced on said land, or any unitized area hereunder,
on or before the 3rd day of September, 1949, this lease shall terminate,
unless Lessee on or before that date pays to lessor a rental. Wilcox v.
Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416, 419 (La. 1954).
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